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A b stract
Does working time affect workers’ health? We study this question in the 
context of a French reform which reduced the standard workweek from 39 
to 35 hours, at constant earnings. Our empirical analysis exploits varia- 
tion in the reduction of working time across employers, which was driven 
by the institutional features of the reform and thus exogenous to workers’ 
health. We find that longer working hours increase smoking and decrease 
self-reported health, and that these impacts are concentrated among blue- 
collar workers. In contrast, white-collar workers’ body mass index increases 
with hours worked.
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1. Introdu ction
Does working time affect workers’ health? Data from employee surveys 
suggest so: for example, in a recent study of European workers, the share 
of respondents who stated that their work negatively affects their health 
rose monotonically from 19% for those working less than 30 hours per week 
to 30% for those working at least 40 hours per week.1 Perceived negative 
health impacts from work also motivated the change to a 6-hour workday, 
at constant earnings, by some Swedish employers, a decision that received 
extensive international media coverage.2 From a theoretical point of view, 
working time may affect health because of potential direct health impacts of 
work, such as physically strenuous work leading to exhaustion, or because 
of its impact on the time available for health production at home, such as 
longer working hours reducing the time for physical exercise.
Empirical studies of the effect of working time on health face two funda­
mental challenges. First, working hours are not randomly assigned, intro- 
ducing bias into any naive regression estimate of the impact of hours. This 
bias may be due to omitted unobserved factors that influence both hours 
and health, or due to reverse causality, whereby health affects hours rather 
than the other way around. Second, estimates of the impact of working 
time are usually confounded by the influence of hours on income, which has 
an important independent effect on health (e.g. Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, 
and Shields, 2005; Lindahl, 2005). Both for determining the importance 
of working time as an input into health production and from a policy per- 
spective, however, the effect of working hours on health keeping income 
constant is particularly relevant.
In this paper, we study the impact of working hours on health in the 
context of a French workweek reform which allows us to address both of
xThese figures are for EU-27 respondents in the 2015 European Survey of Working 
Conditions. Shares of respondents who perceived negative health impacts from their 
work were: 19% (respondents working <30 hours per week), 26% (30-34 hours per 
week), 28% (35-39 hours per week), and 30% (40+ hours per week).
2 For example, the switch to a 6-hour workday by a Gothenburg retirement home in 
2015 was covered in The New York Times, The Guardian, and Die Zeit, among many 
other media outlets. Other Swedish employers who reduced or plan to reduce weekly 
working time at constant earnings include a Toyota production plant, several technology 
start-ups, and the municipal administration of Malmü, Sweden’s third largest city.
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these challenges. Introduced by the socialist government in 1998, the reform 
reduced the standard workweek from 39 to 35 hours, at constant earnings. 
Importantly, the laws mandating this reduction included different deadlines 
for implementation for firms of different sizes, which led to substantial 
employer-level variation in working time in subsequent years. These policy- 
driven, exogenous changes in working time, together with the absence of 
income effects, make the French context uniquely suited to study the impact 
of working hours on health.3
Our empirical analysis draws on data from a longitudinal health survey, 
which allows us to follow a sample of male workers from the pre-reform to 
the post-reform period, namely from 1998 to 2002. For each worker, we 
observe whether his employer had implemented the shorter workweek by 
the year 2002, and we use this information to create our binary treatment 
variable. Our main outcome variables are measures of smoking behavior, 
body mass index (BMI), and self-reported health. Notably, smoking and 
high BMI are among the leading preventable causes of death, and both 
outcomes have been widely studied in the medical literature on the impacts 
of working time, yielding mixed results.
We first estimate the impacts of the workweek reform in a difference- 
in-differences framework, comparing the evolution of health outcomes of 
workers in treated and control firms. As a complementary strategy, we 
also present results from lagged dependent variable models, which directly 
exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data. Whereas the difference-in- 
differences specifications assume that any gaps in outcomes between treated 
and control workers would have remained stable absent the reform, the lag- 
ged dependent variable models instead rely on unconfoundedness given past 
outcomes for identification. Thus, these two models are not nested, and 
we can gain some confidence in our results if they yield similar estimates. 
Finally, for both identification strategies, we also run regressions in which 
we instrument actual hours worked with our treatment variable; under the
3Estevao and Sa (2008) and Chemin and Wasmer (2009) study the labor market 
impacts of this workweek reduction. Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo (2014) exploit 
within-household variation in working hours induced by this reform to examine inter- 
dependencies in spousal labor supply. Saffer and Lamiraud (2012) study the impact of 
working time on social interaction in the context of this reform.
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additional assumption that the reform affected health only via its impact 
on working time, these specifications identify the causal effect of working 
hours on health.
The results consistently indicate that working time has negative effects 
on workers’ health behavior and health. In particular, instrumental vari­
able regressions show that one additional hour of work increases smoking 
by 1.4-2.4 percentage points and reduces self-reported health by 0.05-0.08 
points on a scale from 0-10. Working time moreover appears to raise body 
mass index, but this effect is small and imprecisely estimated in the overall 
sample. A heterogeneity analysis reveals that while the impacts on smo­
king and self-reported health are concentrated among blue-collar workers, 
hours raise BMI only among white-collar workers.
All these estimates are very similar across our different identification 
strategies, and they survive a variety of robustness checks aimed at miti- 
gating any remaining concerns about selection effects driving our results. 
For example, we show that effects are unchanged if we focus on a sample 
of likely job stayers, thus effectively ruling out that they are due to en- 
dogenous switching by healthier workers to firms which implemented the 
shorter workweek early on. Similarly, using the method developed by Oster 
(2017), we show that selection based on unobserved factors would need to 
be about ten times as large as selection based on observed control variables 
to explain away the impacts on smoking and self-reported health.
Our paper is related to a large medical literature on the health impacts 
of working time. Studies in that literature have focused predominantly 
on overtime hours and have generally found negative effects on health be- 
haviors and health (e.g. Sparks and Cooper, 1997; van der Hulst, 2003; 
Kivimaki et al., 2015). However, most of those studies have failed to ade- 
quately address the empirical challenges described above.4 Our work furt- 
her connects to two strands of literature within economics that examine the 
health impacts of job displacement (e.g. Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009; 
Marcus, 2014; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2015; Schaller and Stevens,
4One exception is the study by Akerstedt et al. (2001), which experimentally varied 
workweek length, at constant earnings, among a group of female health care and day 
care workers in Sweden. That study found positive effects of a shorter workweek on 
sleep quality, mental fatigue, and heart/respiratory symptoms.
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2015) and retirement (e.g. Coe and Zamarro, 2011). Whereas those papers 
estimate the combined effect of reduced hours and everything else chan- 
ging with job loss or retirement, our study focuses on the pure working 
time impact. Finally, our work also relates to studies showing that health 
tends to improve during recessions (e.g. Ruhm, 2000, 2005). While those 
impacts could theoretically be driven by reductions in hours, more recent 
evidence has identified business cycle externalities as their probable main 
driver (Miller et al., 2009). To conclude, this paper’s main contribution 
is to provide the first credibly causal estimates of the impact of working 
hours on health at a policy-relevant margin.5
2. In stitu tion a l background
Until the late 1990s, the standard workweek in France was set at 39 
hours, with a legal maximum of 130 overtime hours per year and a 25% 
overtime wage premium. This situation changed considerably in 1998, when 
the newly elected left-wing government launched the reform that provides 
the backdrop for our study. The coalition of socialists and several smaller 
parties had campaigned on a program of reducing unemployment via work- 
sharing; in particular, the standard workweek was to be shortened from 
39 to 35 hours, at constant earnings. Once in government, the coalition 
implemented this reduction via two distinct laws, known as Aubry I and 
Aubry II after the then Minister of Labor Martine Aubry. We now describe 
the provisions of these laws which are relevant for our analysis.6
Aubry I was passed in June 1998 and set the standard workweek at 35 
hours in the private sector, with deadlines for implementation in January 
2000 for large firms with more than 20 employees and in January 2002 
for smaller firms. The reduction in hours was to be achieved through 
bargained agreements between employers and employee representatives at 
the firm level. Employers’ incentives to sign such 35-hours agreements 
were threefold. First, after the relevant deadline, hours worked beyond the
5Our work is also related to a recent study by Hamermesh, Kawaguchi, and Lee 
(2017), who show that life satisfaction improved in Korea and Japan after an exogenous 
reduction in the standard workweek.
6This section draws heavily on Estevao and Sa (2008), Askenazy (2013), and Goux, 
Maurin, and Petrongolo (2014).
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thirty-fifth hour were subject to the overtime wage premium, increasing 
labor costs. Second, the law introduced generous payroll tax cuts for firms 
which implemented the shorter workweek before these deadlines. Third, 
the negotiated agreements could allow for more flexible work schedules, the 
possibility of which had been very limited until then. Importantly, because 
workers should not bear the full costs of the reform, Aubry I required 
all agreements to keep the earnings of minimum-wage workers constant. 
In practice, previous studies have found near-zero effects of the reform 
on earnings also for higher-wage workers (Estevao and Sa, 2008; Goux, 
Maurin, and Petrongolo, 2014), a result that we further corroborate in the 
empirical analysis below.
Aubry II was passed in January 2000 and amended some of the rules 
regarding the implementation of the 35-hour workweek. For example, it 
introduced a transitional period with reduced overtime payments for small 
firms, allowing them to employ workers for 39 hours per week at almost 
no additional cost until 2005. The law also made it possible to achieve 
some nominal reduction in hours by simply re-defining working time to 
exclude ‘unproductive breaks’ (Askenazy, 2013). Moreover, firms could now 
implement the shorter hours on an annual basis, with a cap of 1,600 hours 
per worker and year. Finally, both Aubry I and Aubry II included special 
provisions for managers and other professionals with ‘genuine autonomy’ 
in their work: depending on their rank, these workers either could sign 
agreements restricting the number of days (but not hours) worked, or even 
were fully exempt from the new working time regulations.
In the general elections of June 2002, the conservative parties came 
back to power and almost immediately started to remove the incentives 
for employers to sign 35-hours agreements, meaning that the reform was 
discontinued in practice. By that time, however, many firms had already 
switched to the shorter workweek. As could be expected, this group dis- 
proportionately included large firms, which faced the earlier deadline for 
implementation (see Estevao and Sa, 2008). But it also encompassed the 
majority of public sector institutions, which reduced their employees’ wor­
king time even though they were not formally bound by the Aubry laws. 
Taken together, the different deadlines for implementation and the abrupt 
discontinuation of the reform led to substantial employer-level variation in
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working time in the year 2002. Below, we exploit this variation to estimate 
the impact of working hours on health.
3. D ata
We draw on data from the Enquete sur la Sante et la Protection Sociale 
(ESPS), a longitudinal survey of health, health insurance, and health care 
utilization. Around the time of the workweek reduction, the survey followed 
a representative sample of individuals in Metropolitan France, who were 
interviewed every four years. An important feature of ESPS is that it 
allows us to identify which workers were actually affected by the reform. 
In particular, the 2002 wave of the survey asked respondents whether the 
35-hours workweek had been implemented at their current workplace, and 
we construct our treatment variable based on the answers to this question. 
In the remainder of this section, we summarize our data construction and 
measurement, with many more details provided in the Data Appendix.
Our analysis uses individual-level data from the 1998 and 2002 waves 
of ESPS. Specifically, we focus on the subsample of employees interviewed 
in both 2002, when information on treatment was collected, and 1998, gi- 
ving us one pre- and one post-treatment observation per individual.7 To 
ensure that we concentrate on workers whose hours were indeed reduced 
if treated, we impose some additional sample restrictions. In particular, 
we select individuals aged 18-61 and working more than 35 hours in 1998 
(but any number of hours in 2002), and we exclude managers and high- 
level professionals who either were not covered by the Aubry laws or were 
subject to a different treatment (see Section 2). Although the remaining 
sample includes 744 men and 460 women, the main empirical analysis fo- 
cuses exclusively on male workers. The reason is that the first-stage effect
7Due to sample attrition and sample refreshments, not all individuals surveyed in 
1998 were also surveyed in 2002 and vice versa. The year 1998 can reasonably be 
assumed to belong to the pre-treatment period since virtually no employer signed a 35- 
hours agreement before 1999 (see Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo, 2014). While we also 
obtained data from the 1994 and 2006 waves of ESPS, we did not augment our sample 
with these years because (1) the sampling method of the survey changed in 1998, such 
that only a small and unrepresentative sub-sample of 27% of workers is observed also 
in 1994, and (2) various counter-reforms by the conservative government after 2002 
affected treated and untreated individuals in different ways, confounding any impacts 
of the original reform measured in 2006 (see Askenazy, 2013).
6
of treatment on hours is close to zero for women in this particular sample, 
mainly because treated women are less likely to switch from full-time to 
part-time work; we discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5.
We extract three health-related outcome variables from the data: an 
indicator for current smoking, body mass index (BMI), and self-reported 
health, which ranges from 0 to 10. The effect of working time on smoking 
has been widely studied in the medical literature and has yielded mixed 
results (e.g. Lallukka et al., 2008; Angrave, Charlwood, and Wooden, 2014). 
The proposed mechanism tying hours to smoking in these studies is usually 
job-related stress. Working time may also influence BMI via changes in 
diet or (the time spent on) physical exercise. Notably, both smoking and 
high BMI -  in particular, a BMI higher than 25 -  are among the leading 
preventable causes of death. Finally, working hours may affect self-reported 
health via a large number of physical and psychological channels.8
The treatment variable in our regressions is an indicator for working for 
an employer who had implemented the 35-hours workweek. While the exact 
dates that these hours reductions were carried out are not observed in the 
data, Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo (2014) show that only very few firms 
switched to the shorter hours before the year 2000. Thus, the treatment 
captures exposure to the 35-hours workweek for at most 2-3 years.
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of key variables in 1998 
separately for the 588 treated and 156 control workers in the sample. While 
the two groups appear similar regarding age, marital status, and household 
income, treated workers tend to have higher levels of education. Interes- 
tingly, treated workers also work fewer hours on average already before the 
introduction of the 35-hours week, and they are more likely to be employed 
in the public sector. In contrast, there are no statistically significant dif-
8ESPS also asks respondents which health conditions they are currently suffering 
from, with answers coded according to the International Classification of Diseases. Un- 
fortunately, due to the small sample size, estimates of the impact of the shortened 
workweek on even broad groups of diseases were always very imprecise and thus little 
informative. This motivates our focus on smoking, BMI, and self-reported health, which 
have relatively high incidence or variation in the sample, see Table 1. Furthermore, while 
the 2002 wave of ESPS contains information on other health behaviors with high inci- 
dence such as frequency of drinking and exercising, the lack of data for 1998 means that 
we cannot use these behaviors as outcomes in our analysis.
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ferences in terms of smoking, body mass index, and self-reported health 
between the two groups. Below, we explain in detail how our regressions 
account for these observable as well as for unobservable differences between 
treated and control workers.
4. Em pirical stra tegy
Two fundamental challenges arise when trying to estimate the effect of 
working hours on health. First, working time is not randomly assigned, 
introducing bias into any naive regression estimate of the impact of hours. 
This bias may be due to omitted unobserved factors that influence both 
hours and health, or due to reverse causality, whereby health affects hours 
rather than the other way around. Second, even if working time were 
randomly assigned, the estimate would still be confounded by the usual 
impact of hours on income, which has an important independent effect on 
health (e.g. Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields, 2005; Lindahl, 2005). 
For determining the importance of working time as an input into health 
production, however, the pure hours effect is the actual quantity of interest.
The French workweek reform provides us with the unique opportunity 
to address both of these empirical challenges. In particular, it generated 
policy-driven, employer-level variation in working time which was arguably 
exogenous from an individual worker’s perspective. Moreover, since income 
was unaffected by the reform, the pure hours effect can be disentangled 
from the income effect under some additional assumptions set out below. 
Our first identification strategy leverages these features in a difference- 
in-differences framework similar to the one used by Goux, Maurin, and 
Petrongolo (2014). We estimate:
Yit =  ai + PiPostt + ^ 2 Treatedi * Postt + £u , (1)
where Yit is a health-related outcome for individual i at time t, a¡ is a vector 
of individual fixed effects, Postt is an indicator taking value 1 for t =  2002 
and value 0 for t =  1998, and Treatedi is an indicator for whether i ’s 
employer in 2002 adopted the 35-hours workweek. Note that the individual 
fixed effects absorb all time-invariant individual characteristics, including 
treatment status Treatedi . In other words, the specification in equation (1)
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controls for any constant differences between treated and control workers.
Equation 1 is a classical difference-in-differences specification with two 
groups and two periods. Under the assumption that differences in health 
between treated and untreated individuals would have been stable in ab- 
sence of the workweek reform (“parallel trends”), it identifies the causal 
effect of switching to the 35-hours workweek. A drawback of having only a 
single pre-treatment period is that we cannot provide evidence in support 
of this assumption, for example by showing that trends in health for the 
two groups were parallel before the reform. To lend additional credibility 
to our results, we therefore also present estimates of the following lagged 
dependent variable specification:
Yi,2002 =  7l Treatedi +  72 ,^1998 + X/g199873 + £i,2002, (2)
where Xi,1998 is a vector of individual-level control variables measured in 
1998 and the other variables are defined as above. Unlike the difference- 
in-differences model, which accounts for selection into treatment based on 
fixed group and worker characteristics, the specification in equation 2 relies 
on the assumption of unconfoundedness given past outcomes for identifi- 
cation. Thus, the two specifications are not nested, and we can gain some 
confidence in our results if they yield similar estimates.
The regression models considered so far aim at identifying the overall, 
reduced-form effect of the workweek reform on workers’ health. In con- 
trast, the policy-relevant question that this paper intends to address is 
how working hours affect workers’ health. As described in Section 2, the 
Aubry laws mainly mandated a shortening of the standard workweek from 
39 to 35 hours, but also introduced some other changes such as flexible 
work schedules. Under the assumption that the reform influenced health 
only via its effect on working time, we can use the treatment variable as an 
instrument for hours to provide a direct estimate of the impact of working 
hours on health. Accordingly, Section 5 below presents estimates from both 
the reduced-form specifications in equations 1 and 2 and the corresponding 
instrumental-variable regressions.
Finally, we note that from the description of the workweek reform in 
Section 2, one could devise at least two alternative identification strategies
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which are not used here. First, one may want to directly exploit variation 
in firm size in conjunction with the different deadlines for small and large 
firms. Unfortunately, this strategy is not feasible here because firm size is 
not observed in the ESPS data.9 Second, one may be tempted to use part- 
time workers as an alternative control group. However, Oliveira and Ulrich 
(2002) show that part-time workers in treated firms actually increased their 
hours slightly in response to the reform, a result which we confirmed in our 
data. Thus, part-time workers were also affected by the reform, rendering 
them a bad control group.10 In contrast, we present results from two com- 
plementary specifications which rely on distinct (untestable) assumptions 
for identification. Comparing the estimates from these models allows us to 
assess the robustness of our results.
5. R esu lts
5.1. Effects on hours and income
Figure 1 shows the distributions of hours in 1998 and 2002 separately for 
the treatment and control groups. In both groups, the distribution peaks 
at 39 hours in 1998, with about half the workers reporting this amount of 
weekly working time. In the treatment group, this peak shifts to 35 hours 
in 2002, whereas the mode stays at 39 hours in the control group, pointing 
to a strong negative impact of the reform on working time.
Column 1 of Table 2 quantifies this first-stage effect. Panel A reports an 
estimate of a 2.5-hour decrease for treated workers based on the difference- 
in-differences specification. In comparison, the estimate based on the lag- 
ged dependent variable model in Panel B is 3.4 hours. The two regressions 
thus yield roughly similar results; however, both estimates fall short of the 
nominal 4-hour reduction in the standard workweek. Potential reasons for 
this difference include re-definitions of working time, implementation of 
the shorter hours at the annual rather than weekly level (see Section 2), or
9We are not aware of any dataset which contains relevant information on both firm 
size and health outcomes for the period before and after the workweek reform.
10Similarly, managers are unlikely to be a valid control group, as they were also partly 
affected by the reform. Moreover, because the Aubry laws were vague on who actually 
could be considered a manager, it is impossible to cleanly identify this group in the data.
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simply an increased use of overtime work by employers who implemented 
the 35-hours workweek.11
Column 2 of Table 2 reports estimates of the effect of the reform on 
monthly household income. This outcome serves as a rough proxy for 
individual earnings, which unfortunately are not observed in the ESPS 
data (see the Data Appendix for details). In line with the findings from 
previous studies of the French workweek reduction (Estevao and Sa, 2008; 
Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo, 2014), the results indicate an economically 
and statistically insignificant effect of the shorter workweek on income. 
Overall, the estimates in Table 2 thus confirm the expected impacts of the 
reform: it reduced weekly working hours at constant earnings.12
5.2. Effects on smoking, BMI, and self-reported health
Table 3 presents our main results for smoking, BMI, and self-reported 
health. Column 1 shows that working for a treated firm leads to a 6 percen- 
tage point decrease in smoking, independently of the identification strategy 
used (panels A and B). Under the assumption that this effect is driven only 
by the reduction in hours, this translates into a 1.4-2.4 percentage point 
increase in smoking per additional hour worked (panels C and D). Columns 
2 and 3 show impacts on smoking separately for individuals who did versus 
did not smoke in 1998. The estimates reveal that the negative effect in the 
overall sample is driven primarily by quitting of baseline smokers, rather 
than non-initiation of baseline non-smokers.13
Column 4 reports a small negative impact of the workweek reform on 
BMI, with instrumental variable regressions suggesting a 0.03-0.04 increase 
for each additional hour of work. Qualitatively similar results are obtai- 
ned when rather than a continuous outcome measure, indicators for being
11 Previous studies have also found that workers who were affected by the reform 
reduced their labor supply by less than 4 hours; see Estevao and Sa (2008), Saffer and 
Lamiraud (2012), and Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo (2014).
12Throughout the paper, we report results from regressions which weight observations 
using the sampling weights provided by ESPS, although in practice this makes little 
difference. Furthermore, in order to maximize sample size, we always report results for 
the full set of workers observed with a particular outcome; restricting the sample to 
workers who are observed with all outcomes gives very similar estimates.
13Table 3 reports estimates for smoking based on linear probability models. Results 
from probit specifications are very similar and are available on request.
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overweight or obese are used (results available on request). However, none 
of these estimates is statistically significant at conventional levels. Finally, 
column 5 shows a negative effect of working time on self-reported health: 
for each additional hour worked, health decreases by 0.05-0.08 on a scale 
from 0-10.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 consistently indicate that wor- 
kers’ health improves as working hours decline. Across all outcomes, the 
estimates from the difference-in-differences and lagged dependent variable 
specifications are quite similar, which should give us some confidence that 
they reflect causal effects. While we are unable to provide direct evidence 
on the mechanisms behind these health improvements, a decrease in work- 
related health damage and stress and an increase in leisure time spent on 
health-promoting activities appear natural explanations for our findings.
5.3. Heterogeneity
An interesting question is whether the impact of the shorter workweek 
differs by workers’ occupation or age. In Table 4, we separate workers into 
blue-collar and white-collar occupations and report estimates of the effect 
of treatment on hours and health for each of the two groups. Even though 
both types of workers experience the same reduction in hours, there are stri- 
king differences in the impacts of the shorter workweek on their health. In 
particular, whereas treatment decreases smoking by 10 percentage points 
and increases self-reported health by 0.2-0.4 for blue-collar workers, the 
estimated effects for white-collar workers are close to zero and not statisti­
cally significant at conventional levels. In contrast, BMI decreases among 
white-collar workers but, if anything, increases among blue-collar workers. 
A potential explanation for this last result is that blue-collar workers burn 
more calories on the job, and that they do not use the additional free time 
for a correspondingly larger increase in physical exercise.
Table 5 reports estimated impacts of the workweek reform separately 
for workers who were aged 18-39 versus 40-61 at baseline. Columns 1 and 
5 show that the size of the hours reduction was about twice as large for 
older workers at 3.4-4.4 hours. Analogously, these workers experienced a 
substantially larger improvement in their health. For example, treatment 
increased older workers’ self-reported health by a significant 0.3-0.4, whe-
12
reas the estimated impact on younger workers is only about one third of 
that size and not statistically significant at conventional levels.
5.4. Results for women
As discussed in Section 3, the empirical analysis focuses on male wor- 
kers because the first-stage effect of treatment on hours is close to zero for 
female workers in our particular sample. Importantly, this is not due to tre- 
ated women not reducing their working time; rather, women in the control 
group are more likely to switch to part-time work. This pattern is clearly 
visible in Appendix Figure 1, which replicates Figure 1 for the sample of 
female workers, and is confirmed by the finding of small and statistically 
insignificant coefficients in first-stage regressions of hours on treatment.14 
One potential explanation for this pattern is that women find it easier to 
combine a 35-hours workweek with caring for their children, which might 
be why there is less switching to part-time work among treated women. 
This intuition is also shared by other researchers investigating the French 
workweek reform (Askenazy, 2013; Estevao and Sa, 2008).15
6. R ob u stn ess
6.1. Accounting for endogenous employer switching
One potential worry with the results presented above is that they are 
due to endogenous mobility between the treatment and control groups. For 
example, healthy workers might value their leisure time more and decide 
to switch to employers with a reduced workweek. Such endogenous sor- 
ting would not compromise our difference-in-differences estimates as long 
as workers’ preferences are fixed over time. But it might jeopardize our 
lagged dependent variable estimates if sorting is not fully accounted for by
14The first-stage coefficient estimates are -0.21 and -1.08 in the difference-in- 
differences specification and lagged dependent variable specification, respectively. Sepa- 
rate regressions moreover indicate that treatment raises women’s likelihood of working 
full-time by 8 percentage points. These results are available upon request.
15For example, Askenazy (2013) states that “a large number of women who work four 
days per week (i.e. women who do not work Wednesdays, when there is no school for 
young children) can more easily supply 35 hours of full-time work than 39 hours of 
full-time work.” While childbearing cannot be perfectly observed in the ESPS data, we 
confirmed that the first stage is stronger for women in households without children.
13
differences in lagged outcomes. One way to rule this mechanism out is to 
focus on a subsample of job-stayers, that is, workers who did not change 
employer between 1998 and 2002. Unfortunately, because the ESPS data 
do not include firm identifiers, we are unable to unambiguously identify job- 
stayers. Instead, we present results for increasingly stringent subsamples 
of likely job-stayers.
The first part of Table 6 shows results for a subsample of workers who 
report having a permanent contract in both 1998 and 2002 and who intui- 
tively are less likely to switch jobs than workers on temporary contracts. 
The second part of the table further restricts this subsample to workers 
who did not switch between the public and private sector. Finally, the last 
part of the table additionally excludes workers who changed occupation 
type or profession between 1998 and 2002.16 Across all these subsamples 
and specifications, the impacts of the shorter workweek are very similar 
to our main estimates, even though the precision of the estimates is natu- 
rally reduced. Therefore, we can be reasonably confident that endogenous 
employer switching is not driving our results.
6.2. Differences between treated and control firms
As described in detail in Section 2, firms of different sizes were incen- 
tivized to implement the 35-hours workweek at different points of time. 
Therefore, the bulk of the variation in treatment status observed in 2002 is 
likely coming from differences in firm size (see also Estevao and Sá (2008), 
who directly exploit differences in firm size for identification). One might 
nevertheless be concerned that employers who did versus did not operate 
on a 35-hour schedule differ in ways related to workers’ health, and that 
these differences are not constant over time (and thus not accounted for 
by the difference-in-differences models) and not fully captured by observa­
ble differences in baseline health (which are accounted for by the lagged 
dependent variable models). Here, we present two pieces of evidence that
16 The subsample in the last part of Table 6 almost certainly excludes some workers 
who actually did not change jobs. This is because the questions eliciting occupation 
type and profession are ambiguous in the ESPS survey. For example, workers are asked 
to name the perceived type of their occupation, with possible answers including the very 
similar “qualified worker” and “specialized worker.” See the Data Appendix for further 
details on these variables.
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this is not the case.
First, we show results for a matched sample of workers with comparable 
socio-demographic and job characteristics. Intuitively, if workers are very 
similar on these characteristics, they are also unlikely to be on differen- 
tial trends in health-related variables. Therefore, following the suggestion 
by Crump et al. (2009), we estimated workers’ propensity to be treated 
using a logit regression, and restricted the sample to individuals with es- 
timated propensity scores between 0.1 and 0.9.17 As Appendix Table 1 
shows, workers in this sample appear much more similar in terms of their 
socio-demographic and job characteristics compared to the unrestricted 
sample. Importantly, the regression results for the matched sample, which 
are shown in Appendix Table 2, are generally very similar to the ones re- 
ported above. This suggests that differential trends are not behind the 
health improvements of treated workers.
Second, we address the specific concern that employers who operate on 
a 35-hour schedule might be disproportionately located in areas where the 
local economy is trending upwards, a trend that might itself be related 
to improvements in health. To rule this explanation out, we estimated 
difference-in-differences specifications in which we controlled for the local 
unemployment rate as a proxy for economic activity. The results from 
these regressions were again very similar to those reported above, and are 
available upon request. Overall, there is thus no evidence that endogenous 
implementation of the shorter workweek is driving our results.
6.3. Judging the importance of selection on unobservables
As an alternative to ruling out specific ways in which selection on unob- 
servables could drive our results, we now ask how large such selection would 
need to be to explain away our main effects. Our analysis builds on the 
methodology presented in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and recently re- 
fined by Oster (2017), which relies on comparing the coefficient of interest 
and the R-squared between regressions with and without control variables 
to gain insights into the importance of omitted variable bias. Here, we fo- 
cus on the calculation of 5, which is the ratio of the impact of unobservables
17 The characteristics used to predict treatment are the ones used in the lagged de- 
pendent variable specifications.
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to the impact of observable controls that would drive the coefficient on the 
treatment variable to zero. As a point of reference, Oster (2017) suggests 
that effects for which 5 > 1 can be considered robust.
Table 7 shows the results from our analysis. We concentrate on the lag- 
ged dependent variable specification, which explicitly relies on the assump- 
tion that selection effects can be captured by observable control variables, 
and present estimates only for smoking and self-reported health, for which 
we find (marginally) significant effects in the overall sample. Columns 1 
and 2 show that in a regression of smoking on the treatment dummy, ad- 
ding controls reduces the coefficient in absolute value from -0.073 to -0.057, 
while increasing the R-squared from 0.004 to 0.596. The corresponding 5 
indicates that selection on unobservables would have to be more than nine 
times as large as the selection on observed controls to make the effect in 
column 2 go to zero, a value well beyond the threshold of one.18
Columns 3 and 4 present the results for self-reported health. In contrast 
to smoking, the inclusion of controls moves the coefficient on the treatment 
dummy away from zero. The corresponding 5 implies that to explain away 
the impact in column 4, unobservables would have to move the coefficient 
in the opposite direction as observables, and their influence would have to 
be ten times as large. Taken together, the results in Table 7 thus strongly 
suggests that omitted variable bias is not driving our results.
7. C onclusion
In this paper, we study whether working time causally affects workers’ 
health, a question that is important both for learning about the health pro­
duction function and for informing labor market policy. To overcome pro- 
blems of non-random assignment of hours and confounding income effects, 
our empirical analysis exploits a French reform that shortened the stan­
dard workweek from 39 to 35 hours, at constant earnings. Our difference- 
in-differences and lagged dependent variable models use variation in the 
adoption of this shorter workweek across workplaces, which is mostly dri-
18For our calculation of S, we use the Stata command -p saca lc -. Following the 
recommendation in Oster (2017), we assume that the inclusion of unobservables would 
increase the R-squared to 1.3 times the value in the regression with controls.
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ven by institutional features of the reform and thus arguably exogenous 
from an individual worker’s perspective.
Our estimates show that working time negatively affects health beha- 
viors and health: four years after the reform was initiated, treated workers 
who saw their hours reduced are 6 percentage points less likely to smoke and 
report 0.2 units higher self-reported health on a scale from 0-10. Results 
are always very similar across our different identification strategies, and 
they survive a series of robustness checks which address potential concerns 
about time-varying differences between treated and control workers as well 
as sorting of workers across firms. This consistency across specifications 
makes us confident that our estimates reflect causal effects.
Our paper provides the first credibly causal evidence on the impact of 
working hours on health at a policy-relevant margin. As such, our results 
inform the current debate in many firms and countries about the potential 
benefits of shorter working days.
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D a ta  A p p en d ix
Merging the 1998 and 2002 waves of ESPS
The empirical analysis is based on the 1998 and 2002 waves of the 
Enquete sur la Sante et la Protection Sociale (ESPS). The survey draws a 
random sample of individuals from an administrative database of the three 
main public health insurance funds in France. The selected individuals, 
who are referred to as “assurés principaux” (APs, “main insured”), as well 
as all members of their households are then interviewed for the survey. APs
19
interviewed in 1998 were contacted again to participate in the 2002 wave 
of ESPS, and also in that wave, the current (i.e. 2002) members of their 
households were asked to participate. As usual, there was some attrition 
such that not all APs surveyed in 1998 are observed also in 2002; moreover, 
the sample was refreshed with some individuals not surveyed in the earlier 
years. The resulting sample is representative of 95% of the households in 
Metropolitan France. In our analysis, we weight observations using the 
sampling weights provided with the 1998 data.19
The data contain unique household identifiers that are consistent across 
all waves of ESPS. Moreover, there is an indicator for whether an indivi­
dual is an AP. Together, these variables let us uniquely identify APs across 
the two waves of our sample. In order to identify non-AP household mem- 
bers across the two waves, we matched individuals on their relationship to 
the AP (partner, child, father or mother, brother or sister), gender, and 
age within households, keeping only unique matches. In principal, these 
matches could still be “false positives,” e.g. when the AP changes partner 
between 1998 and 2002 and the new partner has the same gender and age 
as the old partner. To get a sense of the magnitude of this problem, we 
exploited the fact that in 1994 and 1998 (but not in 2002), the first five let- 
ters of individuals’ first names are available in the data. In our final sample 
of males used in the empirical analysis, only two out of the 220 individuals 
who are observed also in 1994 did not have the same first name in 1994 and 
1998 (and results are robust to excluding them from the sample).20 This 
suggests that our within-household matching procedure works very well.
Construction of variables
The data contain information on individuals’ age, gender, and educa- 
tion. For the latter variable, we collapse the available six categories into 
three education levels: lower secondary or less, upper secondary, and ter- 
tiary. We also use information on household size and household income.
19 Results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar if no sampling weights are 
used. For detailed information on ESPS sampling procedures, questionnaires, etc. (in 
French), see the ESPS website: http://www.irdes.fr/recherche/enquetes/esps-enquete- 
sur-la-sante-et-la-protection-sociale/questionnaires.html.
20We allowed for some differences in the spelling of names; for example, we would not 
count “JJacq” (which likely stands for Jean-Jacques) and “Jean-” as different names.
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The latter is only available as a categorical variable, with different intervals 
in 1998 and 2002. For our analysis, we construct a continuous variable by 
imputing household income at the midpoint of each interval and conver- 
ting the values to 1998 euros.21 Finally, we use information on the region 
of residence (eight different regions) of the respondent.
We construct our hours variable from the answers to the question “Com­
bien d’heures travaille-t-elle par semaine hors trajet?,” which translates as 
“How many hours do you work per week, not counting commuting time?” 
We discard the top 1% of values, corresponding to working more than 70 
hours, as many of these values are likely misreported (e.g., some individuals 
report working 160 hours per week).
Regarding occupation type, the data contain information on whether 
an employee works in the public or private sector as well as information 
about her occupation from two questions. The first of these questions asks 
employees about their perceived occupation type, with possible answers 
“unskilled worker /  specialized worker,” “qualified worker,” “employee,” 
“technician, foreman,” and “engineer, professional” (“cadre” in French). 
The second question asks about employees’ profession, with answers coded 
into 19 different categories. As described in the main text, managers and 
high-level professionals were subject to special rules under the Aubry laws 
and are therefore excluded from our analysis. Unfortunately, the laws were 
not very specific regarding the definition of these managers. In our analy- 
sis, we consider employees with the following profession to be managers or 
high-level professionals: artists, traders, business and executive managers, 
and liberal and intellectual professionals.22 We experimented with a host of 
alternative definitions of managers and found that our results were robust 
to using any of them (details are available upon request). Finally, we consi- 
dered employees with perceived occupation “unskilled worker /  specialized 
worker” or “qualified worker” as blue-collar workers, and all other employ- 
ees as white-collar workers. Again, we experimented with using alternative
21The highest income intervals in 1998 and 2002 are not bounded from above. In our 
newly-constructed variable, we set household income to missing for these intervals.
22In French, the categories are: “artisan,” “commercant et assimile,” “chef
d’entreprise de 10 salaries et plus,” “profession liberale,” “profession intellectuelle, ar- 
tiste, cadre fonction publique,” and “cadre d’entreprise.”
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definitions and found that our results were robust to this.
Our three main outcome variables are an indicator for whether an indi­
vidual is a current smoker, self-reported health on a scale from 0 to 10, and 
body mass index (BMI). For the latter variable, we exclude extreme values 
above 65 which are likely misreported (a BMI of 65 corresponds, e.g., to a 
person measuring 175cm and weighing 200kg).
Sample restrictions
As described in the main text, we focus on a sample of male workers 
who are aged 18-61 in 1998 and who are employed in both 1998 and 2002. 
We drop individuals without information on treatment status or on the 
health-related outcomes used in our analysis. We further drop individuals 
working less than 35 hours in 1998 as well as managers and professionals, 
who received special treatment under the Aubry laws.
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Figure 1
Weekly working hours by treatm ent status and year
Table 1
Means and standard deviations in 1998 by treatment status
Treated Control Difference fp-value]
Socio-demographic characteristics 
Age 38.16 37.23 0.93
(8.21) (8.32) [0-21]
Education 
Lower secondary 0.66 0.79 -0.13
(0.47) (0.41) [<0.01]
Upper secondary 0.17 0.12 0.05
(0.38) (0.33) [0-14]
Tertiarv 0.17 0.09 0.08
(0.37) (0.29) [0-02]
Married 0.84 0.87 -0.02
(0.36) (0.34) [0-45]
Household size 3.32 3.52 -0.19
(1.31) (1.31) [0-10]
Household income 2033 1932 101.35
(790) (763) [0-16]
Job characteristics
Hours 40.76 42.45 -1.69
(4.62) (5.97) [<o.oi]
Blue collar 0.44 0.64 -0.19
(0.50) (0.48) [<o.oi]
Public sector 0.21 0.15 0.06
(0.41) (0.35) [0-08]
Health-related outcomes
Current smoker 0.36 0.37 -0.02
(0.48) (0.48) [0-71]
Bodv mass Índex 24.81 25.18 -0.31
(3.17) (4.03) [0-33]
Self-reported health 8.53 8.60 -0.08
(1.35) (1.24) [0-50]
No. of workers 588 156
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of key variables separately for 
the 588 treated and the 156 control workers in the sample. Household income measures monthly income 
in euros. Self-reported health ranges from 0-10, with higher values indicating better health. For further 
details regarding all variables used in the empirical analysis, see the Data Appendix.
Table 2
Effects on hours and household income
Hours Household income___________(1)___________(2)
Panel A: difference-in-difftrences estimates
Treated x post -2.516*** -22.333
(0.516) (75.355)
Panel B: lagged dependent variable estimates
Treated -3.439*** -2.983
(0.506) (70.352)
No. of workers 744 613
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of workplace implementation of the 35-hours workweek 
on working hours and household income. Specifications in panel A control for individual fixed effects and 
a dummy for post. Specifications in panel B control for the dependent variable measured in 1998 as well 
as for age, age squared, education, marital status, household size, five occupation-type dummies, eleven 
profession dummies, a public-sector dummy, and eight región dummies, all measured in 1998. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.



Table 6
Accounting for endogenous employer switching
Notes: The table reports estimates from regressions which probe the robustness of the main results in 
Table 3 to endogenous employer switching. In the upper part of the table (“subsample A”), the sample is 
restricted to workers who report having a permanent work contract in both 1998 and 2002. In the middle 
part of the table (“subsample B”), this sample is further restricted to only inelude workers who did not 
change from the public to the prívate sector or vice versa between 1998 and 2002. The lower part of 
the table (“subsample C”) additionally restriets this sample to workers who report the same occupation 
type and profession in 1998 and 2002; see the Data Appendix for details on these variables. For details 
on specifications, see the notes to Tables 2 and 3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
individual level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 7
Judging the importance of selection on unobservables
Notes: Estimates based on the lagged dependent variable specification. Columns 1 and 3 report estimates 
from regressions of smoking behavior and self-reported health, respectively, on the treatment dummy 
without further controls. Columns 2 and 4 add controls as in panel B of Table 3. The final row shows 
the amount of selection on unobservables necessary, relative to the amount of selection on observable 
controls, to explain away the coefficient in the respective column. For the calculation of this S, we use 
the Stata command -psacalc-, setting Rmax to 1.3 times the R? in the respective column; for details, 
see text and Oster (2017). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
A p p e n d ix  F ig u re  1
Weekly working hours by treatm ent status and year for female workers
A p p en d ix  Table 1
Means and standard deviations in 1998 by treatment status (matched sample)
Notes: For details on the variables, see the Notes to Table 1 and the Data Appendix. For details on the 
construction of the matched sample, see text.
A p p en d ix  Table 2
Regression results for the matched sample
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of workplace implementation of the 35-hours workweek on 
working hours, smoking behavior, BMI, and self-reported health for the matched sample. For details on 
the specifications, see the notes to Tables 2 and 3. For details on the construction of the matched sample, 
see text. First-stage F statistics are always above 10. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the individual level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
